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Abstract
There has been a substantial interest among
scholars in digital platforms and their governance. This
paper proposes a different perspective on the
phenomenon, by providing observations on non-focal
firms’ dependencies to external platforms. Using the
case study results of Finnish firms’ utilization of a
monopolistic BankID authentication platform, we
describe the platform ecosystem and its transformation
on organizational and technology aspects. We show
how legislation can transform the roles and relations
between ecosystem participants and lead to the longtime dominant legacy platform weakening. Our study
extends existing research on platforms and contributes
new knowledge about the enforced adoption of the
platform by heterogeneous organizations. These
findings have important managerial implications, as
they inform how non-focal firms can understand the use
of existing and coming digital platforms.

1. Introduction
Ever-evolving digital platforms are ubiquitous.
Platforms are disruptive to organizations and users
across all sectors, by transforming the ways to think,
operate and innovate [1]. A company can generate new
business value by using shared and external multi-sided
platforms [2] like restaurants using Facebook for
reservations management, companies using EBay and
Amazon marketplaces for in B2B, or LinkedIn as a core
platform for human resources management. By external
platform utilization, we imply a phenomenon when the
platform's core offering is shared and collectively
utilized by heterogeneous actors to build the services
that extend not the platform’s functionality, but their
own capability.
Extant platform ecosystems research provides little
guidance on firms and platforms interrelationships,
from the perspective of those organizations that do not
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50074
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-1-9
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Kari Smolander
Department of Computer
Science Aalto University,
Helsinki, Finland
kari.smolander@aalto.fi

own or govern the platform, but profoundly depend on
it. We call these organizations non-focal actors [3]. In
our context, non-focal actors are subordinate platform
ecosystem participants that leverage the power of the
platform for their business needs to extend their
capabilities. Non-focal actors are usually not in a
position of power and control to influence the changes
in response to dynamic needs of a digital ecosystem [4].
Nevertheless, the companies willing to sustain their
competitive advantage have no choice but to engage in
relationships with the platform. Despite calls for
investigating the factors that influence a firm’s strategic
choices on digital platforms [3], [5] there is a dearth of
studies on fundamental understanding of strategic
digital platforms utilization by non-focal firms (both in
industry and academia). This study attempts to
contribute to the discourse on digital platforms by
exploring the cases of dependencies to an industry
platform and untangling “the platform ecosystem
thinking” perceptions from industry professionals. We
demonstrate the example of a proprietary platform
becoming an industry- and country-wide dominant
infrastructure for organizations from public and private
sectors. We then show how legislation changes affect
the platform ecosystem. Our findings also suggest that
the participation in the platform ecosystems, as argued
in existing literature [3], [6], is not always prompted to
ecosystem health and prosperity motives when the
platform adoption is enforced and it is the only choice.

2. Background
Regardless their size, companies need to carefully
choose and identify the directions of their innovation
paths from the myriad of available service platforms [7].
Prior research on digital ecosystems positions platform
owners, tech giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook
and Microsoft, at the center of attention. For example,
Eaton et al. [8] studied the boundary resources
evolution of Apple’s iOS ecosystem. Gawer &
Cusumano [9] studied the strategies for platform
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leadership building. Paradigmatic analysis of digital
application marketplaces and the monopolistic quality
of platforms was discussed by Ghazawneh &
Henfridsson [6] and Eisenmann et al. [10]. The results
obtained by Henfridsson & Bygstad [11] on
configurational perspectives of digital infrastructures
evolution demonstrated the generative mechanisms of
such infrastructures. Adner & Kapoor [12] showed how
the challenges faced by external innovators affect the
focal firm’s (platform owner) outcomes. This
asymmetrical emphasis on focal actors and platform
ecosystem governance makes the work of Selander et al.
[3] on non-focal actors’ capability search and redeem to
stand out from the extant literature. In this idiographic
research explanation [3] based on historical data limited
to Sony Ericsson, the authors acknowledge the need for
empirical evidence that would enrich the
conceptualization and bring a deeper understanding on
first-hand accounts of non-focal actor use of platform
ecosystems. In addition, Huang et al. [13] studied the
tendencies of software vendors to join an innovation
ecosystem with a larger empirical focus. Lindgren et al.
[14] also adopt a non-focal actors perspective and
question how the identity of non-focal actors may be
changed by the participation in an ecosystem. We depart
from this literature by exploring how the organizations
that purely utilize the platforms to extend their own
capability recognize such dependencies.

2.1. Non-focal Perspective
A platform owner or sponsor (i.e. focal actor) often
dominates and exercises control over the innovation
network of its ecosystem [2]. Eck & Uebernickel [15]
define platform providers and sponsors as “platform
orchestrators”. Focal actors regulate the resources and
knowledge flow within the network and, subsequently,
orchestrate the types of innovations created in the
ecosystem [15]. Focal actors also define the boundaries
of the ecosystem by creating different types of entrybarriers. Non-focal actors are subordinate ecosystem
participants that extend their business capabilities by
building their services, products or technologies using
the platform resources. Resources can include a
combination of assets (physical, human or technology),
knowledge, or capabilities. Non-focal actor’s individual
participation in platform ecosystem is not critical for the
ecosystem survival and sustainability, thus non-focal
actors are positioned at the periphery of the ecosystem
from the ecosystem’s perspective [3]. However,
alliances of larger non-focal firms or a majority of small
firms, so called “the power of the crowd”, sometimes
with the help or support of regulating bodies (e.g.
legislation, corporate lobbying) can influence
platforms’ development [8].

In this paper, we show how such changes can take
place in platform ecosystems in the context of Finnish
Identity Management (IDM) standard abatement.
External platforms or industry platforms are “products,
services, or technologies developed by one or more
firms, and which serve as foundations upon which a
larger number of firms can build further complementary
innovations and potentially generate network effects”
[16]. These “larger number of firms” or platformutilizing businesses are in the primary focus of this
research.
The platform orchestrators decide on whether they
can open the platform to their competitors within the
same industry or to other firms in other industries with
complementary assets, such as existing user bases,
technologies, or distribution channels. Lyytinen et al.
[17] identify three strategic behaviors in this regard:
competition (one firm provides a platform and competes
against the other platforms in the ecosystem); coopetition (competing firms within the same industry
decide to collaborate and provide a single intra-industry
platform within the ecosystem); and collaboration
(multiple firms from different industries collaborate to
provide an inter-industry platform). These mechanisms,
especially coopetition, have been mostly studied from
platform and complementor (Independent Software
Vendors, ISVs) perspective, leaving the perspective of
platform-utilizing firms relationships ill-defined.We
aim to contribute to the digital platforms research by
filling this void.

2.2. Platforms, Ecosystems and Infrastructures
We adopt the definition of digital platform as “the
set of components used in common across a product
family whose functionality can be extended by third
parties” [18], [19]. However, this definition is somewhat
framed towards software platforms and independent
software vendors (ISVs) that develop complementary
products to extend the platform core functionality (e.g.
SAP add-ons). Gawer & Cusumano [16] distinguish
platforms between internal and external platforms. They
define internal (company or product) platforms as a set
of assets organized in a common structure from which a
company can efficiently develop and produce a stream
of derivative products [16]. Whereas, external
(industry) platforms are sets of assets organized in a
common structure that act as a foundation upon which
external innovators can develop their own
complementary products, technologies, or services.
It is important to highlight the inseparability of
social and technical constructs when investigating the
digital artefacts in an organizational context. The same
applies to platforms and infrastructures; they are sociotechnical entities comprising social (governance rules
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and social actors) and technical aspects (systems and
architecture). We agree with Hanseth & Lyytinen [20]
that the differences between platforms and
infrastructures are in their overall increasing
complexity, how they relate to their design and use
environments, and how they behave over time in
relation to those environments. Platforms are integral
parts of digital infrastructures and there is a recursive
relation between them. The core utility of a platform is
that it allows building a valuable service to its users. A
platform that is used to extend firm’s capabilities
becomes that firms’ infrastructure, i.e. the internal
platform can evolve into external platform, when it is an
integral part of its user organizations. In this paper, we
do not seek to reargue the definitions. Rather, we adapt
the interpretation on digital infrastructures from [11] as
“the heterogeneous collection of sociotechnical
components that are essential or contribute to the
functioning of a system, organization or industry.” The
definition could be also adjusted to different contexts:
enterprise, industry, economy, national, regional, and
global levels [21].
Scholars mostly agree on the notion of platform
ecosystem defined as “collectives of organizations that
are interlinked by a reciprocal interest in the prosperity
of a digital platform for materializing their own product
or service” [3]. Organizational economics literature
refers to platform ecosystems as “two-sided markets”,
“multi-sided markets”, or “multi-sided platforms” [2].
Armstrong [22] defines two-sided markets as “markets
involving two groups of agents interacting via
‘platforms’ where one group's benefit from joining a
platform depends on the size of the other group that
joins the platform”. Consequently, a phenomenon
whereby a product or service gains additional value as
more users use it, is called the network effect [23].
The body of knowledge on inter-organizational
networks [23]–[25], business and platform ecosystems
suggests that the focus on a pair or a network of firms
helps to explain different outcomes of firms’ in a given
industry. We follow the relational view theoretical
traditions [25] that stresses the idiosyncratic inter-firm
linkages. This perspective helps us to focus on non-focal
actors’ roles in platform ecosystem by interpreting their
relations and views towards the platform and its
orchestrators.

2.3. Research Problem and Questions
A growing stream of research have investigated the
value co-creation mechanisms of non-focal ISVs.
Platform ecosystems are emerging ubiquitously, across
industries and domains, not being limited to software
add-on development scenarios. As digitalization
progresses, it affects the processes of products and

services creation, and strengthening the role of software
overall. The number of non-focal platform-utilizing
firms usually outnumber the platforms - this is the
characteristic of multi-sided markets [2]. The lack of
theoretical
and
analytical
models
tackling
organizations’ dependencies to various platforms and
infrastructures indicates insufficient understanding of
such phenomenon, consequently making it an important
research direction.
To address the research gaps, we formed the
following research questions to study:
“How do the changes in the platform ecosystem
affects non-focal firms? How can the non-focal actor
relations towards the dominating platform be
characterized? ” To answer these two questions, we
engage in case studies of seven Finnish organizations
that utilize BankID electronic identity management
(eIDM) platform. We inspect the dependency relations
to the monopolistic BankID platform and investigate the
roles that our case-firms have in that ecosystem.

3. Research Process
This research followed the exploratory case study
design [26]. The holistic case study design is the most
appropriate strategy when a single unit of analysis is
studied within multiple cases [27]. The case study
revolved around our perspective on the phenomenon:
we took the interviewees’ views towards the platform
dependency as a unit of analysis within each casecompany individually. The study design and context are
presented in the following sections.

3.1. Research Site: Platform Dominance
The Finnish electronic Identity Management (eIDM)
is based on three methods: national eID cards (FINEID),
financial associations’ BankID (commonly known as
TUPAS), and MobileIDs endorsed by telecom
operators. However, the TUPAS authentication method
accounts for more than 90% of all online transactions
[28]. In 1999, the state introduced non-mandatory
FINEID cards to replace the older citizen ID card with a
machine-readable smartcard chip, but citizens did not
take the technology into use. In retrospect, experts
account FINEID failure due to high costs of required
card-readers, learning effort to the installation and
certificate usage, user experience (UX) issues and
historically well-disseminated TUPAS BankID [29].
TUPAS identification is a de facto standard from the late
1980s owned and administered by banks association in
Finland. It is based on a combination of PIN and the
paper access codes scheme (the list of One Time
Passwords, OTP). Bank-specific identifiers have a high
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penetration in Finnish market and can be used across a
broad range of services and segments, not just banking,
including e-commerce and governmental e-services.
MobileIDs is a PKI-based (Public Key Infrastructure)
authentication method released by Finnish mobile
operators. It requires a specialized SIM card with a
certificate in it and a contract with the mobile operator.
MobileIDs can be used to access all public e-services,
and many private services.
An important development in the Finnish eIDM case
is the EU eIDAS regulation N°910/2014 on electronic
identification and trust services for electronic
transactions in the internal market [30]. Not going into
details of the legislation vision, we only sketch how it
affects the Finnish eIDM. Starting from mid-2017,
Finnish banks need to lower the prices per transaction in
the private market and allow distributors (Service
Brokers) to solve the contracts and technical integration
complexities. Firms interested in becoming Service
Brokers need to meet the requirements for strong
electronic identification laid down in the legislation.
Practically, the list of registered providers includes
banks, telecom operators, and incumbent service
brokers.

3.2. Case Settings
Our cases include seven Finnish organizations and
firms that utilize TUPAS eIDM platform in their eservices. Initially, the study involved the participation of
three organizations: Telco, PSP and the Agency only.
We did not begin this study with the intention of
studying eIDM platform only. We started with a general
inquiry on external integrations and consequently
discovered the magnitude and dependence degree on
TUPAS standard throughout the country. We further
contacted ISV1, ISV2, City and PRC to get more insights
on TUPAS utilizations.
Telco is a telecommunications operator and a major
cable operator, a pay TV provider in both cable and
terrestrial networks. The company employs around
1600 people and serves around 2.7 million customers.
PSP is a large payment service provider. The
customers of PSP are banks, businesses, merchants and
the public sector. PSP employs approximately 2,400
employees in six countries and according to recent stats
(2016), it served a network of more than 300,000
merchants and 240 banks. PSP’s services also include
the payment and authentication bundle services.
Agency is part of the Finnish government. The
Agency prepares the government's economic and
financial policy as well as the budget, and acts as a tax
policy expert. One of the tasks of the Agency is the
general steering of public sector agencies’ information
management.

PRC is a governmental organization that operates
under the authority of the Agency. PRC’s task is to
develop, support and manage the usage of electronic
data contained in governmental and public Information
Systems.
City is a municipality that represent the local level of
administration. The City council is the main decisionmaking organ in local politics, dealing with issues such
as city planning, schools, health care, and public
transport. The City operates the portal for e-services
where citizens can make appointments and manage
documents electronically.
ISV1 is the small payment service operator that
resolves bureaucratic complexities of salary payments
as an Internet service. Their cloud-based service
provides a suite of open APIs and support services for
any company or individual to integrate payroll features
and salary payments, including integrations between
insurance companies, tax agencies, pension companies,
employment foundations and banks.
ISV2 is a software-development company founded
in 2015. Their main service is a native mobile app for
students that integrates study records, campus restaurant
menus, indoor positioning guide maps, various news
and feeds – all essential information students need in
their daily university life.

3.3. Data Collection and Analysis
We used both primary (i.e. interviews) and secondary
(e.g. reports) data sources for this study. We began by
performing a detailed background check of the
companies, such as progress reports, internet searches,
related case studies and literature review of similar
companies. Companies involved in the study agreed
upon commitment to research interaction and
experimentations prior to research commencement.
We conducted interviews with 24 industry experts,
most of whom have been associated with the industry
for more than 15 years. The interviews were semistructured [26] and lasted at least for one hour.
Each interview began by asking the interviewee’s
position,
background,
experience
and
projects/products/services he or she is managing. Next,
the following discussion covered two topics: existing
utilizations of external platforms, planned/expected
integrations and experiences with TUPAS platform.
Interviews followed the funnel model [27] principle from open to more specific questions. We recorded and
transcribed each interview and coded the data as in
Grounded Theory [31]. We analyzed the gathered data
with a qualitative data coding and analysis tool, Atlas.ti.
We extracted quotes from transcribed interviews that we
believed were relevant regarding the research questions.
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Table 1. Case companies and interviews

Telco

PSP

Agency

PRC

City
ISV1

ISV2

Industry
and size
(number of
employees)
Telecommu
nication
operator.
1700

№ of
Interviewees positions
intervie
ws

Payment
service
provider,
2500
Ministry,
360

4

Governmen
t’s digital
services,
130
Municipalit
y, 40 000
Software
developme
nt, 20
Software
developme
nt, 10

1

9

4

2
2

1

Main architect,
Development manager,
Head of online
performance, Corporate
solutions director, CDO
Services development,
SVP of digital
innovations, Digital
practices manager
Development manager,
Main architect,
Ministerial advisor
E-gov development
project manager

Architect, Head of eservices program
CEO and CTO
(interviewed together)
CEO

For example, we coded “every software would like to
call itself a software platform” with the code
“understanding about platforms”. The quote “when it
comes to let’s say web shop payments identifications we
use TUPAS from other external partners” with the code
“service broker bundling”; and the quote “because it
makes no sense to build it yourself, it is available,
relatively cheap and ready” with the code “reasons for
integration”. We organized these codes into categories
(e.g. generic or case-specific) to each firm
correspondingly and sorted them by social or technical
integration aspect we identified. After this, we created
the findings mapping between firms to find relationships
and associations among them. We coded and analyzed
the data without any priori hypotheses. Our goal was to
let the understanding of the phenomenon emerge from
the data and interviews [32]. We analyzed the
perceptions in industrial organizations about external
platforms, their recognition, realization of existing and
future platform dependencies, associating challenges
and issues.

4. TUPAS: Socio-Technical Perspective

In this section, we present the findings of our case
studies. Intertwined social and technical aspects of
relationships in platform ecosystems are often complex
to analyze. Thereby, we first present the technical view
on integrations (software protocols) in section 4.1,
followed by the organizational perspective on roles in
platform ecosystem in section 4.2. With the aim of
answering the research questions our results cover both
technology-centric and social aspects of the platform
ecosystem transformation. We cross-compare these in
the light of eIDAS: how authentication services in
Finland operated (before) and how the regulation is
changing the ecosystem (after).

4.1. How Actors Integrate to the Platform
Ecosystem?
We describe TUPAS platform from the software and
interactions perspective first. TUPAS protocol has been
jointly specified by the Finnish Federation of Finnish
Financial services (FFI, i.e. all Finnish banks) more than
20 years ago (the latest protocol specification dates from
2013).
Before the eIDAS regulation change: The Service
Provider (a firm willing to authenticate its customers)
initiates the identification by sending an identification
request to the customer (Fig. 1, arrows 1 and 2). The
customer then transfers the request to their own bank’s
identification service by clicking on the bank’s icon
(Fig. 1, arrow 3). The request validity is verified by the
bank and the customer is asked to authenticate (Fig. 1,
arrow 4). At this stage, the customer needs to use the
paper-based OTP password. Only one of the banks has
a token-generator mobile-app. Bank’s TUPAS service
sends a response message to the customer once the
identification has taken place (Fig. 1, arrow 5). The
customer checks the information on the certificate (Fig.
1, arrow 6), and after approving it, returns to the Service
Provider's service (Fig. 1, arrow 7) at which point the
certificate's data is transmitted to the service provider
(Fig. 1, arrow 8).
In short, in order to query the user identity by
accessing the banks customers’ database, the method
comprises a few SOAP over HTTPS calls. From our
case-companies, we learned that the technical
integration is not as difficult as the contracts
management:
“… technical part of the integration like the API calls
look mostly the same from bank to bank. So from a
technical point of view it was quite easy, but the paper
work was huge – ISV2, CEO.
“It is very old and straightforward” – ISV1, CTO.
Examining the relations of case-companies to the
platform from the technology point of view, we observe
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that firms understand the simplicity of integration
process, yet, obsolescence of the standard itself.
“… the protocol sense – really technical sense. There
are some problems with the technology, for instance it
has been demonstrated that you can find SSN numbers
in the cache of the browser”- Telco, Development
manager.

Figure 1. Before: BankID authentication workflow

After the eIDAS regulation change: To comply
with eIDAS regulation, eliminate security issues and
enable single sign-on, the Finnish state decided to move
from TUPAS to SAML and OpenID Connect protocol
suites. The Figure 2 below highlights the changes,
replacing “TUPAS” with “SAML or OpenID Connect”
certificates, and wrapping “Banks” with the “Service
Broker”.

Figure 1. After: BankID authentication workflow

Agency, as a member of the regulatory body,
commented on these:

“Google is using that [SAML, OpenID Connect
protocols], Facebook is using, everyone, those big
players are using, and also the PRC using for long time
already, they have these mandatory protocols that at
least you have to support [specified in the regulation],
and the SAML is mandatory and mobile, OpenID
Connect is mandatory as well” – Agency, Development
manager.
According to one informant, there are signs that that
the TUPAS standard will not be upgraded/updated
according to the new requirements. From the protocol
viewpoint, that means that TUPAS platform might still
be used internally among banks, however, they cannot
offer TUPAS standard to service providers – it will be
prevented by the legislation.
“What could happen is that if there are banks that don’t
want to invest or develop [TUPAS], they could of course
protect these links here with VPNs, to make them private
– because it is only P2P [banks - service Brokers]
connection which is done only once – you could use path
here for indefinite here, with some crypto tunnel. But
you can’t use it in the public internet side.”- Telco,
Development manager.
Though the financial organizations are genuinely
secretive in their plans, the question is still open if the
banks are going to continue cross-collaboration or
develop solutions individually.

4.2. Roles and Relations in Platform Ecosystem
All our case organizations have enthusiastically
acknowledged the eIDAS legislation change. In this
section, we describe the social network view of
ecosystem participants. The view of organizations, their
roles and relations in the context of TUPAS ecosystem
clarifies the individual organizations’ roles and shows
how their relations differentiate and how they are
transformed by the eIDAS regulation.
Before the eIDAS regulation change: Until now,
service providers had to sign separate contracts with
each bank. Some third-party firms (SB in Figures below)
provide both banks and service providers with bundleservices for identity assurance, authentication and
signatures and facilitate the technical deployment
(certificates acquiring, APIs). PRC is responsible for
public sector’s authentication services provision.
Banks kept the right to set the per-transaction
charges in the private sector; the state had negotiated
special pricing for public organizations. Banks could
also refuse the authentication services provision to firms
when “it is evident that the TUPAS certificate would be
used for unethical or illegal activities, or if the use of the
certificate could potentially cause financial or
immaterial losses to the bank” [33].
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market; Telco has expressed the enthusiasm about the
change, as “it is going to open up the market.”
Interestingly, Telco has a service broker firm (SB) that
manages the technical integrations, and after the eIDAS
change takes place – from having partnership relations
they are going to be direct competitors.

5. Discussion

Figure 2. Before: Actors’ social network

After the eIDAS regulation change: The
introduction and legitimization of the man-in-themiddle distributor role solves the complexities of
individual contracts that service provider needs to make
with each bank.
“The biggest relief for us is that we don’t have to make
contracts individually” – City, e-services manager.
“There’s something good in EU” – ISV1, CEO.
Starting from mid-2017, there is a price ceiling for
each authentication transaction, a government-imposed
price control that weakens the banks’ valorization. The
Figure below demonstrates the roles rearrangement
service brokers’1 responsibilities. Currently, the list of
registered brokers includes all Finnish banks, telecom
operators, PRC and others (e.g. SB).

Figure 3. After: Actors’ social network

Obviously, existing broker firms in the private
market are going to face more severe competition.
Telecom operators are also going to enter service broker

We compile the findings and investigate them
through the spectrum of existing theories in the
following themes. The first two themes belong to the
platform and its focal role in the ecosystem, which has
a great influence on the ecosystem development. The
next three themes cover non-focal firms’ resisting and
accommodating attitude towards the dominating
platform; roles and relations reconfiguration along with
power redistribution among ecosystem participants,
which were caused by the legislation change.
Internal to external platform evolution. Gawer and
Cusumano’s [16] distinctions between internal and
external platform (from the platform owners’
perspective) do not fit the case of TUPAS platform as it
is an internal and external at the same time. Banks first
established TUPAS platform for their internal use, and
consequently they opened it to other heterogeneous
actors. Scholars [16] suggest that the evolution from
internal platforms to external platforms hypotheses
would need to be developed and tested. Although it was
not the main focus of this article, our case settings
descriptively provide the context of the platform, which
was used first by the banks only, i.e. was internal,
evolved and became other firms’ infrastructure, i.e.
external. In this paper, we wish to draw attention to the
emergence conditions of such platforms evolution and
their enforced adoption by heterogeneous organizations.
From dominance to deterioration. The success and
sustained dominance of TUPAS platform was
contingent to the resource they possess (i.e. customer
base), which is valuable and hard to imitate [34]. In such
highly-regulated markets, changes can occur due to
legislation, politics, corporate lobbying and technology
disruption. By investigating TUPAS we fortuitously
address the calls for public-private sector partnerships
research [14] by reviewing how the governmental
endorsement contributes to the authentication
platform’s sustained dominance and how the regulation
changes in the ecosystem can recursively lead to the
platform deterioration. Ecosystem changes from the
software perspective could occur via boundary
resources, e.g. data access protocol. The current

1

Service brokers can be service providers simultaneously, but not all
service providers can be brokers. There is a complex procedure in
place in order to attain brokering license
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platform literature offers powerful lenses for
conceptualizing the role of boundary resources 2 as a
mechanism to secure platform owner’s power and solve
the paradox of control and generativity stimulation.
[35], [36]. TUPAS eIDM case demonstrates how the
platform itself is being counter-influenced through the
boundary resources, i.e. the communication protocols
defined by the platform owners are modified by more
powerful entities. In this case the EU became the
regulatory body.
The fact that banks have been using OTPs printed on
paper for nearly 20 years is an ideal case of an
incumbent inertia effect. Incumbent inertia happens
when the market leader does not adjust to the new
challenges of the market, or do not wish to change their
strategy or products. Platform orchestrators must
manage the delicate balance of generativity and control
in the platform [37]. Banks in Finland exercised too
much control over the TUPAS platform, with the risk of
driving out third-party developers, thus possibly
preventing the generativity of the platform.
Resistance and accommodation. Our caseorganizations understand that the TUPAS “as
technology” is obsolete; nevertheless, they are enforced
to use it. We observe slight contrasting attitudes towards
the platform as “banks” and platform as “protocol”.
PSP, given the close relationships with the banks and
financial institutions, is in cooperating relationships
with the BankID method. We observe that Telco, due to
its attempts to promote the MobileID method, has more
competitive attitude to the platform and a forced
acceptance of the standard itself. Agency, PRC and City,
being public sector organizations, cannot interfere in
private market’s development, thus, also need to take
BankID methods in use. Brandenburger and Nalebuff
[38] define “co-opete” as “competing without having to
kill the opposition and cooperating without having to
ignore self-interest.” Coopetititive attitude towards the
platform is observed among the firms that own a
competitive
authentication
method
(FINEID,
MobileID). We could also observe the acquiescence, i.e.
reluctant acceptance of the platform dominance among
smaller organizations. ISV1 and ISV2 are small firms
that do not have any special relationships with the
platform and cannot influence conditions in any way.
Non-focal actors’ views we present are complex, and
to some degree with negative perception of platform
owners’ dominance and the forced utilization of the
platform. Thus, the concept of actors’ interest in
ecosystem’s health and prosperity [3] may not always

be true. Such relations towards the dominating platform
can occur when the platform becomes “the only choice”.
Power distribution. Regulation changes can disrupt
the roles of actors and disseminate the cumulative power
in platform ecosystems. Recent literature has
investigated the challenges of organizational identity
transformations when establishing novel relationships
with other ecosystem participants [14]. In this paper, we
show that identity boundaries may be ambiguous and
imprecise as the real dependencies could be masked
with the complex service provider & orchestrator
relations. In TUPAS case, banks still own the platform,
but are forced to open the access to it to service brokers.
That is to say that the cumulative power in the
ecosystem is the same, but due to eIDAS regulation is
more distributed among actors. Banks’ position is
weakened while service brokers gain more control.
Roles and relations reconfiguration. From social
and organizational perspectives, regulation changes can
affect the roles of ecosystem participants. Relations
between firms are not always linear; firms can be
partners in one market and be competitors in another.
Lyytinen et al. in [17] point out that the participation in
platform ecosystems pushes “innovators to increasingly
connect and reconnect to actors across a myriad of
organizations and communities; this will lead to a
continuing expansion and reconfiguration of innovation
networks, making them more like anarchic networks”
(italics is ours). In this paper, we support this theoretical
implication with example cases. The lesson learned
from this last theme is that the firms should learn how
to switch cautiously from e.g. partnership-based
relations to direct competitors or vice versa.

6. Limitations and Future research
One of the key concepts of digitalization could be
when the data - once entered is always retrievable. Most
organizations, if not all, will need to open up and expose
their interfaces and data flows, so it may trigger
innovation and lead to an authentic digital society [21].
The same applies to the case we presented; identity
management is an important step towards the successful
digital services advancement in a society. In this paper,
we presented how seven Finnish organizations have
different perceptions on industry platform dependence.
This study has limitations. The empirical evidence we
provide may be industry or country specific. Qualitative
research findings illustrate the specific phenomena
studied in real-life settings and are not generalizable to
the population as such. However, case studies not only

2

Boundary resources refer to “the software tools and regulations that
serve as the interface for the arm’s length relationship between the
platform owner and the application developer” [36].
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bring richer semantical meanings for the problem
understanding, but also can act as an effective
benchmarking method to evaluate the theory, to which
then the solutions could be developed and transferred
into industrial practice. While understanding the
inseparability of political context in studying
contemporary industry platforms we call for more
research to bridge the gap on non-focal actors’
endeavors in ubiquitously emerging platform
ecosystems. In this article, we managed to only scratch
the surface of platform evolution, especially when the
platform is internal and external simultaneously.
Another important perspective is to theorize the
transition of the platform to an infrastructure. These
research directions promise to deliver novel insights and
contribute to our understanding of platform ecosystem
dynamics.

[4]

7. Conclusion

[9]

The present study contributes to the platform
ecosystems studies by providing an empirical
investigation of non-focal actors’ insights on platform
dependence. We show how legislation changes can
affect the roles, relations and power controls of
incumbent ecosystem participants. The Finnish
monopolistic eIDM ecosystem provides a unique
context to describe the platform’s wide adoption,
expansion, which then seem to weaken its position.
Whereas from the non-focal perspective, firms across
sectors exhibit a resisting and accommodating attitude
towards the dominating platform. The findings also
emphasize the role of software as a mechanism to
disrupt the power distribution within the ecosystem.
Extensive integrations to various platforms and
participation in such ecosystems may lead to new roles,
patterns for collaboration or competition and value
proposition mechanisms. Yet non-focal firms need to
understand the “rules” to benefit the most and minimize
the risks of such platform-dependencies.
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